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Recent Developments
BUCKLEW V. PRECYTHE
A prisoner sought to prevent his execution by the state of
Missouri in an applied challenge, arguing that Missouri’s method
of implementation of the death penalty would present him with a
substantial risk of severe pain due to his unique medical
condition, and, thus, would violate the Eighth Amendment. A
plurality of the Court clarified that the Baze and Glossip test
governs all Eight Amendment death penalty challenges. 1 Under
the Baze and Glossip test, “a prisoner must show a feasible and
readily implemented alternative method of execution that would
significantly reduce a substantial risk of sever pain and that the
State has refused to adopt without a legitimate penological
reason.”2 The plurality reaffirmed that the prohibition on cruel
and unusual punishment “does not guarantee a prisoner a painless
death.”3

MADISON V. ALABAMA
An Alabama death-row inmate challenged his execution on
grounds his vascular dementia precluded him from understanding
the rationale for his execution, and, thus, violate the Eighth
Amendment. The inmate argued that Panetti v. Quarterman
which prevented execution of a prisoner whose “mental state is
so distorted by a mental illness” that he has no “rational
understanding” of the reasons for execution precluded his
execution.4 Alabama claimed Panetti did not apply because the
prisoner here suffered from vascular dementia and not psychotic
delusions as in Panetti. The Supreme Court held that the Panetti
analysis applies, regardless of the origin of the “mental
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also Baze v. Rees, 553, U.S. 35 (2008); Glossip v. Gross, 135 S.Ct. 2726
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shortfalls.”5 Thus, the Eight Amendment ban on cruel and
unusual punishment may prohibit executing a prisoner who
suffers from dementia or other cognitive disorders.

NEW PRIME INC. V. OLIVEIRA, 6
A trucker sued New Prime, Inc., a trucking company, alleging that
it underpaid him by misclassifying him as an independent
contractor. He argued that, pursuant to the Federal Arbitration
Act (“FAA”), the threshold question of arbitrability should be
determined by a court, rather than an arbitrator, despite an
arbitration clause in his contract with the trucking company. He
also argued that “contracts of employment,” referenced in Section
1 of the FAA applies to independent contractor agreements. The
Court held that a court should determine the threshold question of
arbitrability for disputes of certain transportation workers, and
also that “contracts of employment” in FAA Section 1 includes
independent contractors.
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